WARDLOW REVISITED: HOW MEDIA COVERAGE OF POLICE
BRUTALITY MAKES EMPIRICAL DATA MORE RELEVANT THAN EVER
Jack T. Vanderford
INTRODUCTION
Freddie Gray stood on a street corner in West Baltimore when he made
eye contact with a uniformed police officer.1 Gray ran from the area after
seeing the officer, who chased Gray down and forced him to stop by drawing
and threatening to use his Taser gun.2 A video taken by a bystander captures
Gray screaming in pain as his arms are handcuffed behind his back and he
is dragged into a police wagon by three police officers.3
Subsequent to Gray’s arrest, and while he was in police custody, Gray’s
spine was partially severed.4 Gray was taken to a nearby hospital where he
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The killings of black Americans, George Floyd, Ahmaud Arbery, and Breonna Taylor, occurred
during this Comment’s final stages of publication. These tragedies and their extensive media
coverage suggests that revisiting empirical data and reversing Wardlow is more imperative than ever.
See Federal Officials Decline Prosecution in the Death of Freddie Gray, DEP’T JUST., Office of
Public Affairs (Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/federal-officials-declineprosecution-death-freddie-gray (providing a detailed account of the circumstances leading up to
Freddie Gray’s death and announcing that the Department of Justice found insufficient evidence
to prosecute the police officers involved in Freddie Gray’s arrest).
Id. All that was discovered upon a frisk of Gray was a small switchblade, the legality of which was
highly contested after the incident. See Freddie Gray’s death in police custody - what we know, BBC (May
23, 2016), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-32400497 (noting one state prosecutor’s
opinion that Gray was falsely accused of carrying an illegal knife).
See, e.g., Video Shows Arrest of Freddie Gray, WASH. POST (Apr. 20, 2015, 6:05 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/video/local/video-shows-arrest-of-freddie-gray/2015/04/20/
c4afcd2c-e7c3-11e4-8581-633c536add4b_video.html?utm_term=.56eb9b06a683 (showing the
forty-six second cell phone video capturing Gray’s arrest).
It is unclear exactly how Gray suffered his injury; however, reports from the incident suggest he
suffered the injury after entering the police wagon. See Freddie Gray’s Death in Police Custody - what we
know, supra note 2 (explaining that when “Mr. Gray was placed inside that van, he was able to talk
. . . . [But when] Gray was taken out of that van he could not talk and he could not breathe[,]” and
that some medical experts believe a “significant force” similar to a car crash would be required to
inflict the sort of injury that Gray suffered); see also Joshua Barajas, Freddie Gray’s
death ruled a homicide, PBS (May 1, 2015, 11:13 AM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/fredd
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underwent spinal surgery, lapsed into a coma, and died a week later.5 The
six officers involved in Freddie Gray’s arrest and death were charged with
manslaughter and murder by Baltimore State’s Attorney; however, all
charges were ultimately dropped.6 Civil unrest spread throughout Baltimore
in the wake of Freddie Gray’s death.7 Protests turned to riots as multiple
businesses were looted and at least fifteen police officers were wounded.8
Freddie Gray’s arrest and subsequent death highlights the potential for
physical abuse of those in police custody. The Freddie Gray tragedy also
forces us to ask harder questions about how our society should balance
effective policing policy with individual autonomy: Why did Freddie Gray
run from the police in the first place? Were the police justified in pursuing
him? What gave the police the legal authority to stop Gray?
The answer to the latter question comes from the Supreme Court’s ruling
in Illinois v. Wardlow.9 The facts of Wardlow are remarkably similar to those
that led to the arrest and death of Freddie Gray. On September 9, 1995, a
four-car caravan carrying uniformed police officers converged on a
neighborhood of Chicago known for drug trafficking.10 As the caravan
passed through the neighborhood, one of two officers in the last car of the
caravan spotted Sam Wardlow standing next to a building carrying an
opaque bag.11 The officer observed Wardlow look in the direction of the
caravan and flee in the opposite direction.12 After a brief maneuver to cut
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ie-grays-death-ruled-homicide (quoting Maryland’s state attorney Marilyn Mosby’s belief that
Gray’s fatal injury “occurred while Mr. Gray was unrestrained by a seatbelt in the custody of the
Baltimore Police Department wagon.”).
Christina Sterbenz, A ‘big question’ surrounds the arrest of Freddie Gray, which sparked riots across Baltimore,
BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 30, 2015, 3:37 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/did-police-have-aright-to-stop-freddie-gray-2015-4.
See Rebecca R. Ruiz, Baltimore Officers Will Face No Federal Charges in Death of Freddie Gray, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/12/us/freddie-gray-baltimore-policefederal-charges.html (reporting the Justice Department’s decision to not press charge against the
police officers involved in Gray’s death because it lacked evidence proving the officers “willfully
violated Gray’s civil rights”.).
See, e.g., Andrea K. McDaniels, Civil unrest related to Freddie Gray death caused depressive symptoms among
mothers in affected neighborhoods, study finds, BALT. SUN (July 20, 2017, 4:00 PM),
https://www.baltimoresun.com/health/bs-hs-stress-freddie-gray-20170720-story.html (detailing a
University of Maryland School of Medicine survey that found a twenty percent increase in those
experiencing symptoms of depression among African American mothers in the Baltimore area just
after Gray’s death, many of whom attributed their anxiety to “what was happening to their
neighborhoods”).
Holly Yan & Dana Ford, Baltimore riots: Looting, fires engulf city after Freddie Gray’s funeral, CNN (Apr.
28, 2015, 10:30 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2015/04/27/us/baltimore-unrest/index.html.
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000).
See id. at 121 (detailing the factual background).
See id. at 121–22 (detailing the factual background).
See id. at 122 (detailing the factual background).
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him off, the officers frisked Wardlow and discovered a .38–caliber
handgun.13
Following his arrest, Wardlow moved to suppress the handgun found on
him from evidence, arguing that the police did not have reasonable
suspicion14 to stop him in the first place.15 After noting that a reasonable
suspicion determination must be based on “commonsense judgements and
inferences about human behavior[,]” the Supreme Court held that the gun
was recovered during a lawful stop and frisk under the Fourth Amendment.16
The Court explained that Wardlow’s unprovoked flight alone did not create
enough reasonable suspicion to justify a stop.17 Rather, the Court held that
Wardlow’s unprovoked flight, in conjunction with his presence in a highcrime area, justified the officers’ reasonable suspicion that he was engaged in
criminal activity.18 This precedent provided the police officers who stopped
Freddie Gray the legal authority to do so, as Gray was in what was deemed
to be a high-crime area of Baltimore19 when he fled.20
Giving police officers additional authority to conduct stops of individuals
that are located in high-crime areas raises the concern that such a policy will
deny citizens equal protection of the law, under the Fourteenth Amendment,
by allowing officers to use “high-crime area” as a proxy for stopping
individuals based on race or socioeconomic status.21 While undoubtedly
13
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See id. (detailing the factual background).
“Reasonable suspicion” is the legal standard required for a police officer to stop and frisk someone
on less than probable cause. The standard is met when an officer “observes unusual conduct which
leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and
that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous . . . .” Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 122.
Id. at 125.
Id. at 124.
Id.
What constitutes a “high-crime area” is the subject of some debate and is often criticized as being
an overly broad and prejudicial term. This Comment does not attempt to define what constitutes
a “high-crime area.” Instead, this Comment will critique the merits of Wardlow’s analysis as well as
the ambiguity of the term “high-crime area.” In the context of Freddie Gray’s case, the Justice
Department stated after the incident that the police officers were in an area known for drug sales
when they began chasing Gray. See Federal Officials Decline Prosecution in the Death of Freddie
Gray, supra note 1 (“At the time [Freddie Gray fled], the bicycle officers were conducting proactive
enforcement in an area known for drug sales.”).
See Todd Oppenheim, Opinion, The bad court ruling that let police chase Freddie Gray, WASH. POST (Dec.
21, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-bad-court-ruling-that-let-police-chasefreddie-gray/2015/12/21/28bc1e54-a78d-11e5-9b92dea7cd4b1a4d_story.html?utm_term=.d4f9bdc7b903 (explaining that the Supreme Court’s
decision in Wardlow is what gave police the legal authority to chase Freddie Gray).
See Ben Grunwald & Jeffrey Fagan, The End of Intuition-Based High-Crime Areas, 107 Cal. L. Rev. 345,
396 (2019) (detailing an empirical investigation based on administrative data from the NYPD,
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important, this Comment will not focus on the effect of Wardlow’s ruling, but
rather will challenge the merit of its arguments and underlying assumptions.
Specifically, this Comment will challenge Wardlow’s assumption that an
individual who runs from the police in a high-crime area is more likely to be
engaged in criminal behavior than an individual who runs from the police in
an area with less criminal activity.
First, this Comment will provide a brief overview of the Terry Doctrine
and explain how the Supreme Court in Wardlow filled the gaps left from
previous Supreme Court decisions with “commonsense judgements.”
Second, this Comment will review and address the arguments in favor of
Wardlow’s precedent. Third, this Comment will explain how empirical
evidence, available to the Supreme Court when Wardlow was decided,
counters the Court’s assumption that an individual’s flight from the police in
a high-crime area is a reliable indicator of criminal activity. Fourth, this
Comment will argue for the continued applicability of old empirical
evidence, especially within the context of increased media coverage of police
brutality against blacks and waning confidence in the police among those
most likely to live in high-crime areas. Fifth, this Comment will explain the
structural problem with Wardlow’s opinion and introduce possible
alternatives to Wardlow’s precedent.
I. THE TERRY DOCTRINE AND WARDLOW’S USE OF
“COMMONSENSE JUDGEMENTS”
A brief overview of the constitutional framework behind stop and frisk is
helpful to understand Wardlow’s underlying assumptions. The Fourth
Amendment establishes that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause . . . .”22 Until the 1960’s, the Supreme Court had not authorized the
search or seizure of a person on anything less than probable cause.23
However, in the landmark case of Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court focused
on the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on “unreasonable searches and

22
23

which found that “[t]he racial composition of the area and the identity of the officer are stronger
predictors of whether an officer deems an area high crime than the crime rate. And officers may
even be using high-crime area as cover to bolster the appearance of constitutional validity in their
weakest stops.”).
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1968) (holding that the Fourth Amendment’s general
proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures does not preclude an officer from stopping
an individual and frisking them for weapons if the officer can “point to specific and articulable facts
which . . . reasonably warrant that intrusion”).
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seizures” to make a new carve out for “on-the-street encounter[s]” between
police officers and “suspicious persons[,]” commonly known as stop and
frisks.24
The Terry court did not explicitly address what constitutes permissible
grounds for a stop. Instead, the Court implicitly established that police
officers have the authority to stop individuals if they have reasonable
suspicion that an individual is engaging in serious criminal activity.25 The
Supreme Court later expanded the Terry doctrine to allow officers to stop
individuals if the officer has reasonable suspicion that a given individual is
engaged in virtually any illegal activity, even minor traffic violations.26
Unfortunately, the Terry court failed to specifically define what constitutes
reasonable suspicion, noting only that the standard falls somewhere below
probable cause27 and above an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or
hunch.”28 Later Supreme Court decisions provided additional guidance on
what constitutes reasonable suspicion, which would instruct the Wardlow
Court in its decision decades later.
First, the Supreme Court recognized in United States v. Sokolow that a
reasonable suspicion “is not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of
legal rules . . . . [Rather, a reviewing court] must consider the totality of the
circumstances—the whole picture.”29 In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, the
Supreme Court held that nervous or evasive behavior is a factor that can
point to reasonable suspicion.30 However, in Florida v. Bostick, the Supreme
24
25
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Id. at 9–10.
See id. at 30 (holding that “where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him
reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot[,]” he can stop
the individual and search him or her for weapons); see also id. at 33 (Harlan, J., concurring)
(reasoning that an officer’s “justifiable suspicion” that an individual is about to engage in robbery
“afforded a proper constitutional basis” for stopping that individual). The Terry Court was explicit
in laying out the standard for when an officer can frisk an individual, stating that a police officer
can conduct “a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he has
reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual . . . .” Id. at 27 (majority
opinion).
See Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 327 (2009) (“[I]n a traffic-stop setting, the first Terry
condition–a lawful investigatory stop–is met whenever it is lawful for the police to detain an
automobile and its occupants pending inquiry into a vehicular violation. The police need not have,
in addition, cause to believe any occupant of the vehicle is involved in criminal activity.”).
Probable cause is defined as existing where “‘the facts and circumstances within their [the officers’]
knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves
to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that’ an offense has been or is being
committed.” Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949) (citation omitted).
Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1989) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885 (1975) (“[E]rratic driving or obvious
attempts to evade officers can support a reasonable suspicion.”); Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1,
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Court acknowledged that “a refusal to cooperate, without more, does not
furnish the minimal level of objective justification needed for a detention or
seizure.”31
Previous Supreme Court cases discussing whether an individual’s
presence in a high-crime area supports reasonable suspicion provided the
Wardlow Court with ambiguous precedent for its decision. In Adams v.
Williams, the Supreme Court noted an individual’s presence in a high-crime
area to be a relevant contextual consideration in deciding whether an officer
had reasonable suspicion to stop that person.32 Yet, the Supreme Court later
added in Brown v. Texas that an individual’s presence in a high-crime area
alone was not sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion.33
These decisions provided the Supreme Court in Wardlow guidance for its
analysis of whether Wardlow’s flight in a high-crime area supported
reasonable suspicion. However, the Wardlow Court ultimately based its
decision on “commonsense judgements.” The use of “commonsense
judgements” in the reasonable suspicion analysis can trace its roots all the
way to the Supreme Court’s decision in Terry. While acknowledging that the
Fourth Amendment demands that an officer “be able to point to specific and
articulable facts” that form the basis for his or her suspicion, the Court went
on to explain that these facts may be “taken together with rational inferences
from those facts” to arrive at a reasonable suspicion.34
Importantly, the Terry Court qualified its endorsement of officers’ use of
inferences from facts to arrive at a reasonable suspicion. The Terry Court
warned that “the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only when it is
assured that at some point the conduct of those charged with enforcing the
laws can be subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who
must evaluate the reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in the light
of the particular circumstances.”35 In making its determination, the Court
explained “it is imperative that the facts be judged against an objective
standard . . . .”36

31
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6 (1984) (holding that two persons who spoke furtively to one another and urged others to leave the
scene amounted to reasonable suspicion).
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991).
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 144, 147–48 (1972). But see id. at 158–59 n.5 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (“The fact that [an individual suspected of carrying a gun is] in a high-crime area is
irrelevant [to Terry’s reasonable suspicion analysis]. In such areas it is more probable than not that
citizens would be more likely to carry weapons authorized by the State to protect themselves.”).
See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979) (“The fact that [a person] was in a neighborhood
frequented by drug users, standing alone, is not a basis for concluding that [the person] himself was
engaged in criminal conduct.”).
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
Id.
Id.
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Later Supreme Court decisions reaffirmed the use of common sense in
reasonable suspicion determinations.37 This ultimately led the Supreme
Court in Wardlow to adopt the use of “commonsense judgements and
inferences about human behavior” and inject its own view of the world into
its determination of the case.38 An individual’s flight at the sight of the police,
according to the Court, goes beyond an individual’s right to ignore the police
and go about one’s business.39 Instead, the Court argued that Wardlow’s
headlong flight at the sight of a police officer was “the consummate act of
evasion.”40
As previously mentioned, the Court did not go as far as to create a brightline rule that flight in the presence of a police officer automatically gives rise
to probable cause that that individual is involved in criminal activity.41
Instead, the Court relied on the context of Wardlow’s flight, specifically his
presence in an area known for narcotics trafficking, to justify a finding of
reasonable suspicion.42 In doing so, the Court relied on its “commonsense”
judgement that a man who runs at the sight of the police in a high-crime
neighborhood is likely to be engaged in criminal activity.43
At first glance, the Wardlow Court’s decision may not seem problematic.
Minimizing the level of crime in society is a goal most people support and
increasing police power could help achieve that goal.44 An individual’s flight
at the sight of a police officer may naturally indicate to many that the
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See, e.g., United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981) (“The [reasonable suspicion analysis]
does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities. Long before the law of probabilities was
articulated as such, practical people formulated certain common-sense conclusions about human
behavior; jurors as factfinders are permitted to do the same–and so are law enforcement officers.”).
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000).
See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497–98 (1983) (“[A] person approached [by an officer] need
not answer any question put to him; indeed, he may decline to listen to the questions at all and may
go on his way.”).
Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124.
The majority in Wardlow does not explicitly state that headlong flight alone is not sufficient to
support probable cause. However, the majority, as well as Justice Stevens’ concurrence in part and
dissent in part, made it clear that the majority did not adopt the bright-line rule requested by the
prosecution: That flight at the sight of a police officer automatically creates reasonable suspicion.
See Wardlow, 528, U.S. at 124 (“Headlong flight . . . is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing . . .
.”); id. at 126 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The Court today wisely
endorses neither per se rule. Instead, it rejects the proposition that flight is . . . necessarily indicative
of ongoing criminal activity . . . .”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 124–25 (majority opinion).
Id.
See, e.g., Inimai M. Chettiar, More Police, Managed More Effectively, Really Can Reduce Crime, THE
ATLANTIC (Feb. 11, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2015/02/morepolice-managed-more-effectively-really-can-reduce-crime/385390/ (finding that a 28% increase in
the amount of police officers employed correlated with a drop in crime of about 5% over the same
period).
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individual wants to avoid police contact, potentially, because the individual
is engaged in criminal activity. The fact that such behavior occurs in a highcrime area, one may reason, only amplifies the suspicion that may
accompany unprovoked flight.
This logic, along with the rest of Wardlow’s “commonsense judgements,”
is better understood when placed within its historical context. Wardlow was
decided in 2000 in the wake of a period of law enforcement reform that
popularized “broken windows” policing. The concept was introduced in
1982 when George Kelling and James Wilson published an article in the
Atlantic arguing for increased criminalization of quality-of-life offenses, such
as public drinking and vagrancy, and emphasizing the necessity to maintain
order in public places.45 Although Kelling and Wilson’s goal of maintaining
order in public places did not explicitly call for an increase in Terry stops, in
practice the increased police enforcement of quality-of-life crimes coincided
with a need to increase police investigation of individuals suspected of
engaging in criminal activity.46
Kelling and Wilson’s ideas were soon implemented across the country,
most famously in New York City where Police Commissioner William
Bratton and Mayor Rudy Giuliani specifically traced the roots of their
quality-of-life initiative back to Kelling and Wilson’s article.47 The
effectiveness of broken windows policing is still contested today.48
Regardless, by 2000, the year in which Wardlow was decided, broken

45
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George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The police and neighborhood safety, THE
ATLANTIC (Mar. 1982), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/brokenwindows/304465/?mod=article_inline.
See Philip B. Heymann, The New Policing, 28 Fordham Urb. L.J. 407, 429 (2000) (“As a matter that
was secondary in theory but, perhaps, primary in practice, ‘Broken Windows’ policing also justified
very large numbers of ‘frisks’ . . . .”).
N.Y.C. POLICE DEP’T, POLICE STRATEGY NO. 5: RECLAIMING THE PUBLIC SPACES OF NEW
YORK 4 (1994), http://marijuana-arrests.com/docs/Bratton-blueprint-1994—Reclaiming-thepublic-spaces-of-NY.pdf.
See William McGurn, Opinion, The Idea That Made America’s Cities Safer, WALL ST. J.,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-idea-that-made-americas-cities-safer11546039296?emailToken=ca76f543912d90cd5ba5bdd69c30f12falFQ7PAk3kBzqRi6uicOITP/
LuOfGHTitr49pst+R/GexuEU1XpNygEqMrVMwXq7QdqjcScJIYc06+JyAxDn8r5pOWlrntG
l+l/krIg0nog%3D&reflink=article_imessage_share (last updated Dec. 29, 2018, 11:43 AM)
(arguing that recent legislation aimed at relieving overincarceration represents a dangerous move
away from broken windows policing); Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows: New
Evidence from New York City and a Five-City Social Experiment, 73 CHI. L. REV. 271, 271 (2006)
(“[E]vidence from New York City and from the five-city social experiment provides no support for
a simple first-order disorder-crime relationship as hypothesized by Wilson and Kelling, nor for the
proposition that broken windows policing is the optimal use of scarce law enforcement resources.”).
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windows policing was championed by many as an effective means by which
to reduce crime.49
With “broken windows” in the backdrop, Wardlow expanded further
police authority to stop and frisk individuals. The Wardlow Court recognized
that strengthening police power does not come without costs. The fact that
“there are innocent reasons for flight from police[,]” the Court admitted, “is
undoubtedly true.”50 That was a risk the Court was willing to accept,
however, reasoning that a “Terry stop [results in] far more minimal intrusion”
than more drastic police action, such as an arrest on probable cause.51 This
may be true in a world where instances of police brutality do not regularly
appear in the media52 or where police profiling is not substantially
documented.53 But in a world where routine Terry stops end in questionable
arrests54 and in the case of Freddie Gray’s death, the intrusions that Wardlow
waives off as acceptable risks do not seem so minimal.
II. THE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF WARDLOW
In order to understand Wardlow’s flaws, it is important to review and
address the arguments in favor of the Court’s decision. These arguments
include: (1) an assumption that an individual’s flight at the sight of a police
officer in a high-crime area indicates criminal behavior; (2) a concern that
not allowing stops in this context would handcuff police officers and

49

50
51
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54

See, e.g., Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: Critique of the Social Influence Conception of Deterrence,
the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance Policing New York Style, 97 MICH. L. REV. 291, 293
(1998) (“[I]t is today practically impossible to find a single scholarly article that takes issue with the
quality-of-life initiative.”).
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000).
Id. at 126.
See, e.g., Byron Mason II, Is the Media to Blame for Police Brutality?, PRINDLE POST (Apr. 12, 2018),
https://www.prindlepost.org/2018/04/is-media-to-blame-for-police-brutality/ (documenting the
string of highly publicized instances of police brutality against African Americans such as Trayvon
Martin, Tamir Rice, Michael Brown, Philando Castile, and Stephon Clark).
See, e.g., N.J. ST. POLICE REV. TEAM, INTERIM REPORT OF THE STATE POLICE REVIEW TEAM
REGARDING ALLEGATIONS OF RACIAL PROFILING (Apr. 20, 1999) (announcing the findings of a
New Jersey report, which found that although a majority of the motorists using the New Jersey
Turnpike were white, roughly 40% of motorists stopped were non-white, over 77% of searches
involved non-whites, and 61.7% of arrests involved blacks); Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp.
2d 540, 563 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding the New York Police Department’s stop and frisk practices
to be racially discriminatory and therefore in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
See N.Y.C. BAR ASS’N, REPORT ON THE NYPD’S STOP-AND-FRISK POLICY 1 (May 15, 2013),
https://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/20072495-StopFriskReport.pdf (“[M]any of the
arrests [subsequent to a stop and frisk] occur under questionable circumstances, such as when
people are asked to remove marijuana from their pockets and then arrested for possessing
marijuana ‘in public view.’”).
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incentivize bad behavior; and (3) a belief that the benefits resulting from such
stops outweigh any accompanying costs. As explained in later sections, these
arguments falter when analyzed using empirical evidence and when viewed
in light of the practical realities of how some Terry stops are conducted.
The Wardlow Court explicitly makes the first argument that a person’s
flight at the sight of a police officer indicates they are engaged in criminal
activity. The Court notes that, “nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent
factor in determining reasonable suspicion.”55 But running from the police,
the Court argues, goes above and beyond mere nervousness in the presence
of an officer. The Court highlights this distinction by describing headlong
flight as “the consummate act of evasion[,]” which is certainly suggestive of
wrongdoing.56 The Court goes on to reject the notion that running at the
sight of a police officer conforms with the precedent that individuals have the
right to ignore the police and go about their business. Instead, the Court
concludes that “[f]light, by its very nature, is not going about one’s business;
in fact, it is just the opposite.”57
Wardlow may be defended further on the grounds that an individual’s
flight from the police is even more indicative of criminal activity when it
occurs in a high-crime area. Again, the Wardlow Court makes this argument
explicitly. Acknowledging that flight alone cannot support a finding of
reasonable suspicion, the Wardlow Court argues that Wardlow’s presence in
a high-crime area, in conjunction with his flight at the sight of a police officer,
does support reasonable suspicion.58 The Court notes that “the fact that the
stop occurred in a ‘high crime area’ [is] among the relevant contextual
considerations in a Terry analysis.”59 Essentially, the Court imputes the
characteristics of an individual’s neighborhood onto the individual,
reasoning that the likelihood that a person present in a high-crime area is
committing a crime is higher than it would be for a person in a low-crime
area. While this assumption may hold true in the aggregate,60 it does not
necessarily hold true when the context is confined to a specific situation, such
as when an individual runs at the sight of a police officer. As explained in
55
56
57
58
59
60

Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124.
Id.
Id. at 125 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 124–25.
Id. at 124 (citation omitted).
There is reason to believe that this assumption may not be true, even in the aggregate, as
disproportionate levels of policing and both conscious and unconscious bias can lead to inaccurate
crime statistics. See Kim Farbota, Black Crime Rates: What Happens When Numbers Aren’t Neutral,
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 2, 2015), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/kim-farbota/black-crimerates-your-st_b_8078586.html (explaining how the heavier policing of urban neighborhoods and
overt racism can lead to minorities being arrested and convicted at much higher rates than
demographics that engage in criminal activities at the same rate).
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later sections, the empirical evidence in this context points to the conclusion
that running from the police is not a reliable indicator of criminal activity,
especially in the context of high-crime areas.
A second argument in favor of Wardlow is that its outcome yields the most
favorable incentive structure.61 Barring the police from stopping those who
flee at the sight of them would arguably incentivize non-compliance with
officers’ questioning. If fleeing at the sight of an officer in a high-crime area
does not give rise to reasonable suspicion, individuals who are engaged in
criminal activity will be encouraged to flee from the police safe in the
knowledge that the police will not have the authority to pursue them. This
may handcuff police officers in situations where they might otherwise curb
illegal activity.
While it may be true that prohibiting officers from stopping those who
run at the sight of them may incentivize those engaged in criminal activity to
always run, this rule would hold true for criminals in low and high-crime
areas alike. Having a rule that differentiates between low and high-crime
areas disregards the potential skewed incentive structure that such a rule
would create in low-crime areas. Distinguishing between low and high-crime
areas is especially problematic in the face of empirical evidence, discussed
below, that suggests that those who run from the police in low-crime areas
are actually more likely to be engaged in criminal activity than those who
run in high-crime areas.
A third argument in favor of Wardlow is that the benefit gained from
investigating individuals that flee at the sight of the police in high-crime areas
outweighs the cost of whatever liberty is sacrificed by allowing such stops.62
A Terry stop “simply allow[s] the officer to briefly investigate further[,]” the
Court explains.63 “If the officer does not learn facts rising to the level of
probable cause, the individual must be allowed to go on his way.”64
Moreover, while a Terry frisk for weapons has been viewed since its inception
as “a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict great
indignity and arouse strong resentment,”65 Wardlow stops short of creating a

61

62
63
64
65

This argument is not directly articulated in the Wardlow majority’s opinion. However, the Court
does address the balance between allowing officers to investigate individuals further with
individuals’ right to go about their business. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125 (“Allowing officers
confronted with such flight to stop the fugitive and investigate further is quite consistent with the
individual’s right to go about his business or to stay put and remain silent in the face of police
questioning.”).
See id. at 126 (explaining that Terry accepts the risk of stopping innocent individuals and that such
stops result in minimal intrusion).
Id.
Id.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 (1968).
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bright-line rule legalizing such frisks in all situations where an individual has
been stopped subsequent to running from the police.66 Instead, the
precedent remains that Terry frisks can only be conducted when an officer
has reasonable suspicion that the person stopped is armed and dangerous.67
Thus, one might argue that the liberty lost by an individual who is
stopped after fleeing from the police in a high-crime area is outweighed by
the benefit that would result from preventing potential criminal activity. But
when the number of innocents stopped becomes disproportionate to the
number of criminals discovered, this cost-benefit argument falters.
Furthermore, Wardlow’s silence as to whether flight from a police officer in a
high-crime area justifies a frisk for weapons fails to protect individuals that
are subject to such stops. Judges often accept officers’ justifications for frisks
despite empirical evidence suggesting that many of the common justifications
are poor indicators that an individual is armed.68 Finally, stopping an
individual who flees at the sight of a police officer presents the possibility that
someone will be injured as a result of the chase. This danger is not
theoretical; it is a reality as evidenced by the death of Freddie Gray.
III. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE DEBUNKS WARDLOW’S
UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS
Wardlow’s conclusion that an individual’s flight from the police in a highcrime area supports reasonable suspicion to stop that individual relies on two
major assumptions. First, Wardlow assumes that a person who runs at the
sight of a police officer in a high-crime area is, in fact, reasonably likely to be
involved in criminal activity. Second, Wardlow’s distinction between high
and low-crime areas assumes that a person in a low-crime area that runs at
the sight of a police officer is less likely to be involved in criminal activity than
a person who does so in a high-crime area. When analyzed in light of
empirical evidence and societal trends, however, these assumptions prove to
be highly questionable.
Wardlow justifies its commonsense judgement that running from the
police in a high-crime area corresponds with criminal behavior by pointing
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In fact, the Wardlow Court explicitly states from the outset that it takes “no opinion as to the
lawfulness of the frisk independently of the stop.” Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 n.2.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
See David Rudovsky & David A. Harris, Terry Stops and Frisks: The Troubling Use of Common Sense in a
World of Empirical Data, 79 OHIO ST. L.J. 501, 541 (2018) (“The data show that certain factors
regularly reported by police, such as observations of a ‘bulge,’ a suspect not being cooperative,
having their hands in their pockets, presence in a high-crime neighborhood, acting nervous or
making furtive movements, and ‘flight’ are poor predictors of whether one is armed and dangerous,
yet the courts have regularly credited these explanations in sustaining police frisks.”).
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to the scientific uncertainties that surround reasonable suspicion
determinations. “In reviewing the propriety of an officer’s conduct,” the
Court rationalized, “courts do not have available empirical studies dealing
with inferences drawn from suspicious behavior, and we cannot reasonably
demand scientific certainty from judges or law enforcement officers where
none exists.”69 Thus, because the Court believed there was no objective data
on which it could rely on, it turned to personal experience to justify its belief.
In the absence of empirical data, common sense might well serve a court
to arrive at the best outcome possible. However, personal experience is no
substitute for empirical data, and as it turns out, the Wardlow Court did
indeed have access to “empirical studies dealing with inferences drawn from
suspicious behavior.”70 In fact, New York’s Office of Attorney General
(OAG) released a report (the Report) just six weeks before Wardlow was
decided providing relevant empirical data with which to analyze the
propositions set forth in Wardlow.71
According to the Report, which collected data on approximately 175,000
stops that occurred in New York City over the course of the year, the citywide hit-rate, or ratio of total stops to the number of stops that led to an
arrest, was 9:1.72 This means that for every nine people stopped on the street
by an officer suspecting that person of criminal behavior, only one person
was eventually arrested. The Report also includes more specific data relating
to the central question that was presented to the court in Wardlow.
The Report shows that the hit-rate on individuals who run after noticing
the police73 is 15.8:1.74 The hit-rate for individuals who run in the presence
of the police, not controlling for whether they noticed the police or not, in a
high-crime area is 20.3:1.75 Most relevantly, the hit-rate for individuals who,
while in a high-crime area, run after noticing the police—the same context
the Court analyzed in Wardlow—is an astounding 45:1.76 The empirical data
from the Report illustrates that an individual who runs after seeing a police
officer while in a high-crime area is about five times less likely to ultimately

69
70
71

72
73
74
75
76

Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124–25.
Id.
See Tracey L. Meares & Bernard E. Harcourt, Foreword: Transparent Adjudication and Social Science
Research in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 733, 786 (2000) (detailing
the results of the New York State Attorney General’s report on stop and frisk practices in New York
City).
Id. at 787.
Note that “unprovoked flight upon noticing the police” was the relevant criteria that the Court
considered in Wardlow. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 (emphasis added).
Meares & Harcourt, supra note 71, at 790.
Id.
Id.
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be arrested on probable cause than those stopped in all other situations.77
Thus, New York’s 1999 OAG Report suggests that Wardlow’s underlying
assumption is false. Flight from the police in a high-crime area proves to be
an incredibly poor indicator of criminal activity.
We should not turn a blind eye to such powerful empirical data, especially
in a world where data analysis has infiltrated nearly all facets of our lives.
Empirical data provides more objective information to supplement our easily
skewed “commonsense judgements” in reasonable suspicion analyses.78
Additionally, this kind of empirical data can provide broader insight into how
our communities perceive and interact with law enforcement. In other
words, the empirical data provided by New York’s 1999 OAG Report should
not only be used to challenge Wardlow’s precedent, it should also prompt
deeper questions into why forty-four innocent individuals in a high-crime
area run after noticing the police for every one individual that is arrested.79
It is not a novel idea that there are innocent reasons for an individual to
run from the police. In fact, Justice Stevens expressed this belief when he
concurred in part and dissented in part to Wardlow’s majority opinion.80
Justice Stevens agreed that the Court should not adopt a bright-line rule
regarding whether running from the police supports reasonable suspicion.81
He stated reviewing courts should look to the “totality of the circumstances–
the whole picture.”82 However, Justice Stevens disagreed with the majority’s
commonsense conclusion that flight in the presence of police is a reliable
indicator of criminal behavior.
Justice Stevens’ listed a number of innocent explanations for why a
person would run in the presence of a police officer. “A pedestrian may

77
78
79

80
81
82

As compared to the previously mentioned 9:1 hit-rate for all stops conducted in New York City
during the course of the study. Id. at 787, 790.
See David Rudovsky & David A. Harris, supra note 68 (discussing the potential positive impacts that
the use of empirical data could have on Terry stop and frisk analyses more broadly).
This of course assumes that those who are not arrested are found to not be engaging in criminal
activity. It is possible that a police officer might find evidence supporting probable cause, but
nonetheless not arrest an individual. However, I have come across no evidence to suggest such is
the case for a large number of stops. See Caroline Forell, Stopping the Violence: Mandatory Arrest and
Police Tort Liability for Failure to Assist Battered Women, 6 BERK. J. GENDER L. & JUST. 215, 221 n.29
(suggesting that police officers may be more likely to not arrest despite having probable cause in
white middle class communities, compared with arrest rates with probable cause in poor or minority
communities).
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 128–29 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
Id. at 127.
Id.
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break into a run for a variety of reasons,”83 Justice Stevens stated, “any of
which might coincide with the arrival of an officer in the vicinity.”84 In
addition to coincidental flight, Justice Stevens added, there are entirely
innocent reasons for flight “[e]ven assuming . . . that a person runs because
he sees the police.”85 Among the reasons that Justice Stevens lists for why an
innocent individual might run after noticing a police officer is a fear of being
apprehended as a guilty party, an unwillingness to appear as a witness, and
a desire to escape the danger from ongoing criminal activity that an officer’s
sudden presence may signify.86
But perhaps the most pertinent motive Justice Stevens puts forth for why
individuals may run at the sight of the police is a fear of the police themselves.
“Among some citizens, particularly minorities and those residing in high
crime areas,”87 explains Justice Stevens “there is also the possibility that the
fleeing person is entirely innocent, but, with or without justification, believes
that contact with the police can itself be dangerous . . . .”88 Stevens cites to a
host of survey findings and empirical studies that help explain the findings of
New York’s 1999 OAG Report. The surveys and studies illustrate
discriminatory police practices and a corresponding distrust and fear of the
police, especially in the context of stop and frisks.89 One article Justice
Stevens cites provides an account from black leaders complaining that
innocent people were being picked up in drug sweeps, noting that “[s]ome
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84
85
86
87

88
89

For example, a pedestrian may begin running “to catch up with a friend a block or two away, to
seek shelter from an impending storm, to arrive at a bus stop before the bus leaves, to get home in
time for dinner, to resume jogging after a pause for rest, to avoid contact with a bore or a bully, or
simply to answer the call of nature.” Id. at 128–29.
Id.
Id. at 131.
Id.
Due to the high-concentration of minorities in inner-city neighborhoods and poverty police
practices that disproportionately target minorities for drug offenses, minorities such as African
Americans disproportionately live in high-crime areas. See Reshaad Shirazi, It’s High Time to Dump
the High Crime Area Factor, 21 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 76, 87 (2016) (showing that although African
Americans account for only 17% of drug use nationwide, they represent 37% of those arrested for
drug use, and 46% of those convicted for drug offenses, while whites account for 82% of drug use
and only 62% of drug arrests).
Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 132.
For example, Justice Stevens cites to a brief from the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund,
which details disproportionate street stops of minority residents in Pittsburgh and Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania and St. Petersburg, Florida. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 132 n.7 (citing Brief for
NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund as Amicus Curiae at 17–19, Illinois v. Wardlow, 528
U.S. 119 (2000) (No. 98-1036)). Justice Stevens also cites to a report by the National Institute of
Justice, which found that 43% of African-Americans consider “police brutality and harassment of
African-Americans a serious problem” in their own communities. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 132 n.7
(citing Jean Johnson et al., Americans’ Views on Crime and Law Enforcement: A Look at Recent Survey Findings,
NAT. INST. JUST. J. 133, 138 (Sept. 1997)).
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teen-agers were so scared of the task force [that] they ran even if they weren’t
selling drugs.”90
We will never know what led Freddie Gray to run at the sight of the
police. We do know, from studies like those cited to by Justice Stevens, that
flight from the police can be spurred by fear over the presence of police
officers themselves, rather than a desire to avoid being caught while engaged
in criminal activity. The fear and distrust of the police that those living in
high crime areas may hold cannot be ignored, especially given a meager 45:1
hit-rate among those fleeing from the police in a high-crime area.91 Thus,
with empirical evidence indicating that flight from the police in a high-crime
area is a poor indicator of criminal activity, it is time the Supreme Court
reconsider Wardlow and its “commonsense judgements” about human
behavior.
IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE AND ITS CONTINUED APPLICABILITY TODAY
Unfortunately, there has not been another study analyzing data akin to
that used in New York’s 1999 OAG Report.92 Racial disparities continue to
exist in the use of Terry stop and frisks.93 For example, while the total number
of stops conducted in New York City has dramatically decreased in recent
years,94 blacks and Latinos continue to be the overwhelming targets, with
59% of stops being conducted on blacks, 29% on Latinos, and only 9% on
whites in 2019.95 This is in stark contrast to the demographic makeup of

90
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92

93

94

95

Wardlow, 528 at 133, n.8 (citing Kotlowitz, Hidden Casualties: Drug War’s Emphasis on Law Enforcement
Takes a Toll on Police, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 11, 1991)).
Meares & Harcourt, supra note 71, at 790.
The most recent report that New York State’s OAG released on stop and frisks came in November
of 2013 but does not contain hit-rate data on individuals stopped after fleeing from the police in a
high-crime area. See generally CIV. RTS. BUREAU, N.Y.S OFF. ATT’Y GEN., REPORT ON ARRESTS
ARISING FROM THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT’S STOP-AND-FRISK PRACTICES
(Nov. 2013) (reviewing data collected from New York’s stop and frisk data, with a particular focus
on arrests resulting from stop and frisks).
See id. at 5 (showing an increase in the amount of stop and frisks in New York City from 1998 to
2012, the vast majority of which is due to an increase in stops conducted on black and Hispanic
individuals); N.Y. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, Stop-and-Frisk Data, https://www.nyclu.org/en/stopand-frisk-data (providing data on stops conducted in New York City in 2019, which shows that
88% of stops were conducted on blacks or Latinos while only 9% of stops were conducted on
whites).
Between 2011 and 2019, the number of recorded stops that occurred in New York City went from
685,724 to 13,459. N.Y. C.L. UNION, Stop-and-Frisk Data, https://www.nyclu.org/en/stop-andfrisk-data.
Id.
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New York City, which is 24.3% black, 29.1% Latino, and 42.7% white.96
With the rise of social media97 leading to increased media coverage of police
brutality against minorities,98 the motivation for a minority individual to flee
at the sight of a police officer may be becoming stronger. Thus, with the
overall level of distrust and fear of the police arguably on the rise, the
empirical data provided in New York’s 1999 OAG Report is as relevant as
ever.
The history of police brutality and its media coverage provide important
context for understanding Wardlow today. The trend of mass-media
coverage of police brutality against minorities arguably began in 1991 with
the highly publicized beating of Rodney King by police officers and the
ensuing riots that took hold across Los Angeles.99 Beginning in 2012 with
the death of Trayvon Martin, an unarmed, seventeen-year-old African
American, at the hands of George Zimmerman, a neighborhood watch
coordinator, there has been a trend of extensive media coverage of instances
of police brutality against unarmed black people.100 Martin’s death was
followed by the killing of a number of unarmed101 black men and boys,
including Michael Brown, Eric Garner, Tamir Rice, and eventually Freddie
Gray, among others.102 Most recently, the killings of George Floyd and
Breonna Taylor have caused nation-wide protests and reignited calls for
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See U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, United States Census Bureau, Quick Facts: New York City, New
York, available at https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/newyorkcitynewyork (last visited Apr. 3,
2020).
Social media has been instrumental in raising awareness of racial injustice in America. See Bijan
Stephen, Social Media Helps Black Lives Matter Fight the Power, WIRED (Nov. 2015),
https://www.wired.com/2015/10/how-black-lives-matter-uses-social-media-to-fight-the-power/
(discussing social media’s pivotal role in spurring the Black Lives Matter Movement by making
videos of police violence against minorities go viral).
See, e.g., Mason II, supra note 52 (documenting the string of highly publicized instances of police
brutality against African Americans such as Trayvon Martin, Tamir Rice, Michael Brown,
Philando Castile, and Stephon Clark).
See Hemant Shah, Press Coverage of Interethnic Conflict: Examples from the Los Angeles Riots of 1992, 2007
J. DISP. RESOL. 177, 181–82 (2007) (suggesting that mass media may have been a cause of some of
the social unrest that followed the beating of Rodney King).
See Eliott C. McLaughlin, We’re Not Seeing More Police Shootings, Just More News Coverage, CNN (Apr.
21, 2015, 7:26 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2015/04/20/us/police-brutality-video-social-mediaattitudes/index.html (proposing that the belief that the number of instances minorities are being
victimized by the police is increasing is untrue, but rather, increased media coverage is distorting
society’s perspective of how common police brutality against minorities is).
The only exception being the small knife that was found on Freddie Gray after officers frisked him.
See Freddie Gray’s Death in Police Custody - What We Know, supra note 2.
See 14 High-Profile Police-Related Deaths of U.S. Blacks, CBC (Dec. 7, 2017, 10:40 PM),
https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/list-police-related-deaths-usa-1.4438618 (documenting fourteen
high-profile deaths of black men that occurred during police encounters).
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police reform.103 Each death came at the hand of law enforcement officers
and received substantial media coverage.104
While the deaths of these young black men and women received
extensive media coverage and spurred the Black Lives Matter Movement,
they represent only a small portion of the total number of minority
individuals killed by police officers in recent years.105 While the more
heinous killings of unarmed minorities are usually the ones to attract
extensive media coverage, a total of 1,000 people per year are killed by the
police, with Latino and black men being on average three times more likely
to be killed by the police than white men.106 These deaths take a significant
toll on the mental health of minority communities.107 Highly publicized
incidences of police brutality against minorities also contribute to a growing
fear of police contact among minority communities.108 In the wake of
Freddie Gray’s death, for example, many Baltimore men said they would
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See Deneen L. Brown, Violent deaths of George Floyd, Breonna Taylor reflect a brutal American
legacy, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (June 3, 2020), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/history/2020/
06/history-of-lynching-violent-deaths-reflect-brutal-american-legacy/ (explaining how the killings
of George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, and Ahmaud Arbery led to nation-wide protests and
demonstrate why the oppression of black people remains the nation's greatest burden).
See Police Shootings Have Not Increased, But Media Coverage Has, 10-8 VIDEO, https://www.108video.com/blog/police-shootings-not-increased-media-coverage (last visited Jan. 29, 2020)
(detailing the rise of smartphones, social media, and police dash and body cams and the role they
have played in the coverage of police shootings).
See Garrett Chase, The Early History of the Black Lives Matter Movement, and the Implications Thereof, 18
NEV. L.J. 1091, 1099 (2018) (covering the history of the Black Lives Matter Movement and its use
of social media to combat police brutality against blacks).
See Frank Edwards & Michael H. Esposito, Police kill about 3 men per day in the US, according to new study,
CONVERSATION (Aug. 6, 2018, 6:40 AM), http://theconversation.com/police-kill-about-3-menper-day-in-the-us-according-to-new-study-100567 (noting that 0.7 white men per 100,000 are
killed by police annually, compared with 2.2 deaths per 100,000 black and Latino men annually).
One study conducted by the Lancet, a prominent medical journal, found that police killings correlate
with an additional 1.7 days of poor mental health annually among black adults. See Erin B. Logan,
This Is How Police Killings Affect Black Mental Health, WASH. POST (July 9, 2018, 9:41
PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2018/07/09/this-is-how-policekillings-affect-black-mental-health/?utm_term=.fe0de63b0662 (detailing the results of a new
medical study, which found there to be an adverse effect on mental health among minorities
subsequent to police shootings).
See Angelica Delgado, Police Brutality: Impacts on Latino and African American Lives and Communities,
SANTA CLARA UNIV. SCHOLAR COMMONS 1, 14 (2016) (noting that some people have a fear of
the police instilled in them at a very young age due to instances of police brutality that occur in
their communities). The fear of the police that some minorities share is also fueled by police officers’
words, rather than their actions. See Christine Hauser & Jacey Fortin, ‘We Only Kill Black People,’
Police Officer Says During Traffic Stop, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/08/31/us/black-kill-police-georgia.html (reporting on a video that captured a police officer
comforting a white woman, saying “But you’re not black . . . Remember, we only kill black people.
Yeah. We only kill black people, right?”).
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continue to run from the police in the future, with one man saying Gray’s
death “makes you run faster.”109
These highly publicized deaths coincide with a growing distrust of the
police among blacks. The percent of blacks that have confidence in the
police has fallen from 34% in 1998, a year which compromises a majority of
the data New York’s 1999 OAG Report analyzed,110 to an even more meager
30% in June of 2017, according to Gallup polls.111 This suggests that overall
confidence in the police among blacks may be lower now than it was in 1999,
when New York’s 1999 OAG Report found the hit-rate for individuals in
high-crime areas who run after noticing the police to be just 45:1.112 While
correlation does not necessarily mean causation, and there are undeniably
additional factors at play, mass-media coverage of police brutality against
young, black men coincides with a declining confidence in the police among
blacks. This trend suggests that innocent, minority individuals’ motivation
to run after noticing the police has, if anything, increased since New York’s
1999 OAG Report was released.
Distrust of the police becomes an even more relevant motive for flight in
the face of police presence when placed in the context of high-crime areas.
Blacks are more likely than other demographics to live in inner-city
neighborhoods, which disproportionately correspond with high-crime
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Those interviewed in Baltimore after Freddie Gray’s death said that running from the police is “a
way of life” and that people often run when they have done nothing wrong. See John Eligon, Running
From Police is the Norm, Some in Baltimore Say, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/11/us/running-from-police-is-the-norm-some-in-baltimoresay.html (“Young men in the heavily policed neighborhood where 25-year-old Freddie Gray was
chased by the police . . . say running from officers is a way of life with its own playbook . . . . And if
getting caught seems inevitable, surrender where there are plenty of witnesses to reduce the odds
of being beaten.”).
New York’s 1999 OAG Report covered stops that occurred in 1998 and the first three months of
1999. Meares & Harcourt, supra note 71, at 786 n.187.
Compare Lawrence W. Sherman, Trust and Confidence in Criminal Justice 8 (2001),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/189106-1.pdf (“[A] Gallup poll reports that whites have
almost twice as much confidence in police (61 percent) as do blacks (34%).”) with Eugene Scott, Only
One-Third of African Americans Say They Have Confidence in the Police. Killings Like Alton Sterling’s Are
Part of the Reason., WASH. POST (Mar. 27, 2018, 4:08 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news
/the-fix/wp/2018/03/27/only-one-third-of-african-americans-say-they-have-confidence-in-thepolice-killings-like-alton-sterlings-are-part-of-the-reason/?utm_term=.3d72c26f731d (“Only 30
percent of black Americans have confidence in the police, according to a Gallup poll from June.”).
See also Claire Gecewicz & Lee Rainie, Why Americans Don’t Fully Trust Many Who Hold Positions of
Power and Responsibility, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 19, 2019), https://www.peoplepress.org/2019/09/19/why-americans-dont-fully-trust-many-who-hold-positions-of-power-andresponsibility/ (“Roughly seven-in-ten white Americans (72%) say police officers treat racial and
ethnic groups equally at least some of the time. By way of comparison, half of Hispanics and just
33% of black adults say the same.”).
See Meares & Harcourt, supra note 71, at 790.
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areas.113 Additionally, statistics show blacks to be disproportionately targeted
by the police for violent crimes and drug offenses.114 For example, while
blacks account for only 14% of the United States population and 17% of
drug use nationwide, they represent 37% of those arrested for drug use and
46% of all defendants convicted for drug offenses.115
This phenomenon could explain the findings from New York’s 1999
OAG Report that while the hit-rate for all individuals who ran after noticing
the police was 15.8:1, the hit-rate when confined to individuals who ran after
noticing the police in high-crime areas is 45:1.116 Thus, the empirical data
suggests that Wardlow’s second assumption, that a person in a low-crime area
who runs at the sight of a police officer is less likely to be involved in criminal
activity than a person who does so in a high-crime area, is false. Instead, the
data suggests that those running to elude the police are less likely to be
engaged in criminal activity in high-crime areas, which are
disproportionately comprised of minorities, compared to individuals running
to elude the police in low or average-crime areas.
It may be impossible to know exactly why a given individual living in a
high-crime area may run at the sight of the police despite being innocent of
criminal behavior. However, the belief among many minorities that the
highly publicized instances of police brutality against minorities are not
isolated incidents, but signs of a broader problem, suggests that a distrust of
the police may be the driving force behind such behavior.117 At the same
time, it is less common for whites to believe that the deaths of blacks during
encounters with the police are signs of a broader problem,118 and the deaths
of whites during encounters with the police happen at a much lower rate.119
This explains why a white individual living in Beverly Hills who runs at the
sight of a police officer may be more likely to be engaged in criminal activity
than a minority individual who does so while living in a high-crime area, as
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See Reshaad Shirazi, It’s High Time to Dump the High-Crime Area Factor, 21 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 76,
86 (2016) (examining how the high-concentration of blacks in inner-city neighborhoods, combined
with the targeting of blacks for drug offenses, has led to blacks disproportionately living in highcrime areas).
Id. at 86–87.
Id. at 87.
See Meares & Harcourt, supra note 71, at 790.
See Rich Morin et al., Behind the Badge: Police views, public views, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 11, 2017),
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2017/01/11/police-views-public-views/ (showing that while
72% of white police officers believe that the deaths of blacks during encounters with the police are
isolated incidents, 79% of blacks overall believe such incidents are signs of a broader problem).
See id. (showing that 54% of whites believe that the deaths of blacks during encounters with the
police are signs of a broader problem, compared with 79% of blacks that believe the same).
See Edwards & Esposito, supra note 106 (showing that blacks are three times more likely to be killed
by the police than are whites).
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the data in New York’s 1999 OAG Report suggests.120 This trend of
declining confidence in the police among minorities indicates that the
findings of New York’s 1999 OAG Report are as relevant today as ever.
V. WARDLOW’S STRUCTURAL PROBLEM AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Putting aside the statistical ineffectiveness of Wardlow’s assumptions in
predicting criminal activity, Wardlow also contains a structural problem in its
reliance on an ambiguous and undefined high-crime rate factor to establish
reasonable suspicion. In concluding that an individual’s flight in a highcrime area created reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop, the Supreme
Court recognized that each factor alone, both flight and an individual’s
presence in a high-crime area, are not enough to constitute reasonable
suspicion.121 Yet, Wardlow’s reliance on an individual’s presence in a highcrime area as a determinative factor in the reasonable suspicion analysis is
misguided due to the factor’s ambiguity. Even if the Supreme Court adopts
a more objective test for defining what constitutes a high-crime area, the use
of the factor still proves to be an ineffective predictor of criminal activity
based on the empirical evidence described earlier. Thus, because the highcrime area factor adds little to a reasonable suspicion analysis, and because
flight alone cannot support reasonable suspicion, Wardlow’s precedent that
flight in a high-crime area supports reasonable suspicion is inherently flawed.
The Supreme Court first established an area’s crime rate as a relevant
factor in a reasonable suspicion analysis in Adams v. Williamson.122 In
upholding a stop that was based on less than probable cause, the Court
concluded that, “[w]hile properly investigating the activity of a person who
was reported to be carrying narcotics and a concealed weapon and who was
sitting alone in a car in a high-crime area at 2:15 in the morning, [the
investigating officer] had ample reason to fear for his safety.”123 However,
after including an area’s crime rate as a relevant factor in a reasonable
suspicion analysis, the Supreme Court failed to offer guidance as to what
qualifies as a high-crime area for Fourth Amendment purposes.124
In the years that followed Adams, the Supreme Court began incorporating
the characteristics of neighborhoods into reasonable suspicion analyses, most
notably in cases dealing with illegal immigration where stops were conducted
120
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122
123
124

See Meares & Harcourt, supra note 71, at 790 (finding that flight “motivated by the presence of a
police officer” resulted in a stop-to-arrest ratio of 15.8:1, but in high crime areas, the stop-to-arrest
ratio was 45:1).
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124–25 (2000).
Adams v. Williamson, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
Id. at 147–48.
Id.
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in areas known for illegal immigrant traffic.125 Despite these developments,
the Court opted not to establish an objective basis for determining when a
location constitutes a high-crime area but rather deferred to officers’ prior
experience in the area.126 Perhaps unsurprisingly, what constitutes a highcrime area presented a difficult question for the lower courts in Wardlow.
Following a state bench trial that found Sam Wardlow guilty of unlawful
use of a weapon by a felon, the Illinois Appellate Court reversed the
judgement, explaining that the court found “no support in the record for the
contention that [the] defendant was in a high crime location” other than an
officer’s testimony that they noticed the defendant while on the way to a place
that “was known to be a location where drugs were sold.”127 In defending its
ruling, the appellate court recognized that “[t]o pass constitutional muster
. . . the high crime area should be a sufficiently localized and identifiable
location.”128 The Illinois Supreme Court disagreed with the appellate court
about whether the incident occurred in a high-crime area but nonetheless
affirmed the reversal of the trial court on grounds that the stop was not
“based upon objective criteria pointing to a reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity.”129 Where a lower court split practically teed up the issue, the
Supreme Court whiffed, failing to provide a clear definition for what
constitutes a high-crime area and instead reversing the Illinois Supreme
Court’s decision on the general principle that flight in a high-crime area
constitutes reasonable suspicion.130 Since Wardlow, courts have developed a
myriad of definitions for what constitutes a high-crime area, none of which
provide an easily applicable, objective basis for determining when a stop
occurs in a high-crime area.131
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126
127
128
129
130

131

See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884–85 (1975) (“Officers may consider the
characteristics of the area in which they encounter a vehicle. Its proximity to the border, the usual
patterns of traffic on the particular road, and previous experience with alien traffic are all
relevant.”); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 419 (1981) (“Of critical importance [to the Terry
analysis], the officers knew that the area was a crossing point for illegal aliens.”).
See Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418 (“[T]he evidence thus collected must be seen and weighed not in terms
of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement.”).
People v. Wardlow, 678 N.E.2d 65, 67–68 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997), aff’d, 701 N.E.2d 484 (Ill. 1998),
rev’d, 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
Id. at 68.
People v. Wardlow, 701 N.E.2d 484, 486–489 (Ill. 1998), rev’d, 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000). The closest the Supreme Court gets to defining what
constitutes a high-crime area is its description of the term as “an area of expected criminal activity.”
Id. at 124.
See, e.g., United States v. Baskin, 401 F.3d 788, 793 (7th Cir. 2005) (rejecting the idea that specific
data be required to prove an event took place in a high-crime area and adopting Wardlow’s
description of the term as an area of expected criminal activity); Cunningham v. State, 884 So. 2d
1121, 1122 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (describing a high-crime area “in [its] usual sense [as] being
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Without a clear, objective definition for what constitutes a high-crime
area, the factor raises far more questions than it answers. At its most basic
level, the high-crime area factor raises the question of how high the incidence
of crime must be for an area to be considered a high-crime area. Answering
this question is not as simple as one might think. Is it sufficient for an area
to have above-average levels of crime, or is there some higher bar that must
be met before high-crime area status is attained? If the factor does refer to
above average crime rates, does the standard relate to the national, state, or
city average? What constitutes the geographic scope of a high-crime area?
Do we only look at a few square blocks, or do we analyze crime areas by
neighborhood or city? Does a high incidence of any type of crime in an area
satisfy the high-crime area factor, or must the area have a high incidence of
the type of crime that the officer is suspicious of an individual committing?
Can high-crime area status change over time, and if so, when and how often?
Does an officer’s prior knowledge of an area’s status as a high-crime area
play a role in whether she has reasonable suspicion when she stops an
individual, or do we analyze the factor in hindsight?
Without answers to these questions, Wardlow’s high-crime area factor will
remain substantially subjective, adding little, if any, value to the reasonable
suspicion analysis. This is especially true when an area’s high-crime status is
determined almost entirely by the retrospective and subjective testimony of
police officers.132 A court should not shirk its responsibility to make a legal
conclusion of fact to police officers.133 While police officers may act in good
faith in testifying to their personal experience regarding a neighborhood’s
characteristics, their perspective may easily be skewed by the inevitable
correlation between the time they spend in the areas they patrol and the rate

132

133

riddled with narcotics dealings and drug-related shootings”); People v. Davis, 815 N.E.2d 92, 98–
99 (Ill. Ct. App. 2004) (defining a high-crime area as being an area that is “notorious for any type
of criminal activity”); United States v. Rogers, No. Crim. 03-10313-RGS, 2005 WL 478001, at *1
(D. Mass. Mar. 1, 2005) (describing a high-crime area as an area that is “plagued by gang-related
shootings, drug dealings, assaults, and robberies”); State v. Biehl, No. 22054, 2004 WL 2806340,
at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 8, 2004) (defining a high-crime area as “an area of known drug activity,
or perhaps a location under police surveillance”).
See, e.g., Hannah Rose Wisniewski, It’s Time to Define High-Crime: Using Statistics in Court to Support an
Officer’s Subjective “High-Crime Area” Designation, 38 NEW ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 101,
122 (2012) (“It is presumptively unreasonable that courts allow a mathematical conclusion like
‘high-crime area’ to be defined by subjective testimony . . . .”); Reshaad Shirazi, It’s High Time to
Dump the High-Crime Area Factor, 21 Berk. J. Crim. L. 76, 98 (2016) (“What is most troubling about
[the Wardlow opinion] is that [it] allowed the prosecution to satisfy the ‘high-crime area’ designation
based solely on the subjective testimony of a single officer.”).
See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson & Damien Bernache, The “High-Crime Area” Question: Requiring
Verifiable and Quantifiable Evidence for Fourth Amendment Reasonable Suspicion Analysis, 57 AM. U. L. REV.
1587, 1624 (2008) (“[I]n relying on the testifying officer for the opinion about an area, courts are
shifting the responsibility to police to make what is a legal conclusion.”).
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at which they perceive crimes to occur in those areas.134 Thus, if an area’s
crime-rate is to add any objective value to the reasonable suspicion analysis,
courts must shift away from their reliance on officers’ personal experiences
and towards the use of empirical data.
The implementation of an objective method for determining whether a
stop occurred in a high-crime area is not a far-flung idea. In fact, some
prominent academics have already put forth proposals that could replace the
existing subjective method with an objective approach based on empirical
data. For example, Andrew Ferguson and Damien Bernache proposed an
objective approach to determining when an incident occurred in a highcrime area based on three components:
First, the area in question would have to be demonstrated to be marked by
a high incidence of particularized criminal activity in comparison to
neighboring areas with objective and verifiable data. Second, the area at
issue would have to be narrowly tailored to a certain geographic location
(perhaps including particular blocks, housing complexes, parks, or
intersections) and would have to be current, limited to a recent temporal
finding of recent crime activity. Third, the nexus between the particularized
criminal activity and the officer’s observation would have to be
demonstrated.135

The Supreme Court adopting such an approach would resolve a number
of ambiguities around the current methods courts use to determine when a
stop occurred in a high-crime area. With new crime-mapping technologies,
this approach could be implemented to not only inform courts’ reasonable
suspicion analyses retrospectively, but also to inform officers in real-time as
to whether an individual they are suspicious of is located in an area with
recent criminal activity of the type they suspect the individual to be engaged
in.136 If the Supreme Court is to continue its use of a location’s crime-rate in
reasonable suspicion analyses, it is imperative for it to adopt an objective
determination to prevent an area’s crime rate from serving as a proxy for
speculative hunches and unconscious biases.
Yet, even with an objective approach to defining what constitutes a highcrime area, the use of an individual’s presence in a high-crime area to impute
reasonable suspicion remains problematic. In Wardlow’s context, for
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See id. (“[W]e expect police officers to consider their beats a high-crime area because they are
looking for—or responding to—reports of crime every day.”).
Id. at 1628.
See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Crime Mapping and the Fourth Amendment: Redrawing “High-Crime Areas”,
63 HASTINGS L.J. 179, 219 (2011) (“With advancement in GIS technology, data-collection
mechanisms now allow for a more particularized understanding of crime patterns in Fourth
Amendment suppression hearings . . . . In some jurisdictions, new crime maps are generated every
twenty-four hours and can be shared with officers and staff and even emailed to officers on the
beat.”).
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example, an individual who flees after noticing a police officer is less likely to
have been engaged in criminal activity than an individual who does the same
in an average to low-crime area, according to empirical evidence.137
Additionally, some minorities are more likely than other demographics to
live in urban neighborhoods where crime rates tend to be higher.138 This
phenomenon may be explained by disproportionate targeting of minorities
for violent crimes and drug offenses.139 While transitioning to a more
objective approach to determine high-crime areas would limit the use of the
high-crime area factor as a substitute for “specific and articulable facts,”140 it
would distribute uneven levels of constitutional protections to citizens based
on where they live.141 The Terry doctrine’s use of reasonable suspicion
inherently requires police officers to consider the context of their
observations, but it is important for both courts and law enforcement to not
“tar people with the sins of their neighbors.”142
Therefore, a reasonable suspicion analysis would be improved by doing
away with the high-crime area factor altogether. In fact, some state courts
have already begun challenging Wardlow’s precedent using empirical data.143
For example, in Commonwealth v. Warren, the Massachusetts Supreme Court
held that flight from a police officer, even in a high-crime area,144 does not
137
138
139
140
141

142
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See Meares & Harcourt, supra note 71, at 787, 790 (noting that the stop-to-arrest ratio upon noticing
the police is 45:1 in high crime areas, but 15.8:1 generally).
See Shirazi, supra note 113 (“[P]oor African Americans are more likely to reside in inner-city
neighborhoods than whites” where there is more violent crime).
See id. at 86–87 (noting that African Americans are disproportionately arrested for violent crimes
and drug offenses and that high rates of “poverty police practices” target inner-city neighborhoods).
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
See Shirazi, supra note 113, at 104 (“[T]he main concern [with the use of the high-crime area factor]
is that high-crime areas are predominately high-black areas, and thus overly policing these areas
disparately impact African Americans.”).
See United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1139 n.32 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)
(“[M]ore than mere war stories are required to establish the existence of a high-crime area . . . .
[C]ourts should examine with care the specific data underlying any such assertion. Moreover, both
courts and law enforcement must be careful not to tar people with the sins of their neighbors.”).
See David Rudovsky & David A. Harris, Terry Stops and Frisks: The Troubling Use of Common Sense in a
World of Empirical Data, 79 OHIO ST. L.J. 501, 538 (2018) (“[S]ome courts have recognized the
relevance of empirical evidence in providing a more particularized Fourth Amendment analysis of
the reasons provided for stops and frisks.”).
The Massachusetts Supreme Court never explicitly mentions crime-rate as being a factor in the
reasonable suspicion analysis. However, the area the officer first saw the defendant, on Martin
Luther King Boulevard in the Roxbury section of Boston, has been described as a high-crime area
by those covering the case. John G. Malcolm, Massachusetts Supreme Court Says It’s Perfectly
Legitimate for Black Men to Flee Police, DAILY SIGNAL (Sept. 23, 2016), https://www.dailysignal.com/
2016/09/23/massachusetts-supreme-court-says-its-perfectly-legitimate-for-black-men-to-fleepolice/. Thus, the Massachusetts Supreme Court’s silence on the high-crime area factor, in
addition to its holding that empirical data suggests flight does not provide a valid inference of
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support reasonable suspicion due to a recent Boston Police Department
report documenting a pattern of racial profiling of black males in the city.145
The court explained that it does not forbid lower courts from considering
flight in a reasonable suspicion analysis but rather urges them to consider
empirical data that bears on the validity of the motivations behind a Terry
stop.146
The Supreme Court should adopt a similar approach to the one used by
Massachusetts’ Supreme Court, by either adopting a more objective method
to defining high-crime areas or, preferably, dropping the high-crime area
factor altogether. Should the Court retain the high-crime area factor, it
should be careful to confine its use to sufficiently specific locations within a
narrow period of time, to prevent excessive and unwarranted variances in
constitutional protections among citizens. Importantly, improvements in
data collection and technology since Wardlow have made switching to a more
objective, data-driven approach to reasonable suspicion analyses more
accessible than ever.147 It is now time for the courts to rectify Wardlow’s
antiquated approach to the reasonable suspicion analysis by foregoing
subjective judgements based on personal experience for more objective
decisions based on empirical evidence.
CONCLUSION
Twenty years ago, the Supreme Court used its “commonsense
judgements” to conclude that an individual’s flight from the police in a highcrime area supports reasonable suspicion to stop that individual. However,
empirical data provided by New York’s 1999 OAG Report shows that
individuals who run to elude the police in a high-crime area are five times
less likely to be engaged in criminal behavior than all other individuals
stopped.
A study analyzing hit-rate data on individuals who flee after noticing the
police, as was done in New York’s 1999 OAG Report, has not been
recreated. However, mass media coverage of police brutality against
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criminal activity, is tantamount to a rejection of Wardlow’s precedent that flight in a high-crime area
supports reasonable suspicion.
Commonwealth v. Warren, 58 N.E.3d 333, 342–43 (Mass. 2016).
Id. at 342.
See David Rudovsky & David A. Harris, Terry Stops and Frisks: The Troubling Use of Common Sense in a
World of Empirical Data, 79 OHIO ST. L.J. 501, 513 (2018) (“[T]here now exists an almost
inexhaustible stream of data concerning a wide array of human activities . . . . Using powerful
analytical computing, we can examine these vast troves of data to discover patterns that might
otherwise remain hidden.”).
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blacks,148 accompanied by growing levels of distrust of the police among
minorities,149 suggests that the motivation for minorities to avoid police
contact has grown stronger since 1999 when New York’s OAG Report was
published. Furthermore, Wardlow’s reliance on the high-crime area factor
presents an inherent structural flaw to Wardlow’s precedent due to the
ambiguity surrounding the factor’s definition and the variance in
constitutional protections that it provides to citizens. Thus, the Supreme
Court should either adopt a more objective, data-driven approach for
determining what constitutes a high-crime area or, preferably, drop the highcrime rate factor altogether.
It is now time for the Supreme Court to reject the precedent it set in
Wardlow by recognizing that an individual’s effort to avoid police contact in
a high-crime area does not, without additional information, support
reasonable suspicion. By foregoing its subjective use of “commonsense
judgements” in favor of empirical data and the observance of societal trends,
the Court may avoid unsubstantiated and often dangerous Terry stops in the
future, such as the one that led to the death of Freddie Gray.
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See Stephen, supra note 97 (discussing social media’s role in spurring the Black Lives Matter
Movement); Mason II, supra note 52 (analyzing the role of media on police brutality); McLaughlin,
supra note 100 (noting the increasing media coverage of police brutality against minorities); 14 highprofile police-related deaths of U.S. blacks, supra note 102 (documenting 14 high-profile police-related
deaths of black Americans).
See Sherman, supra note 111 (noting a Gallup poll that recorded that whites have almost twice as
much confidence in police as do blacks); Scott, supra note 111 (reporting that a Gallup poll recorded
decreasing levels of confidence in police from black Americans between 2001 and 2018).
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